World Ruler Sher’s few hours down the rabbit hole of investigating Development Banks
World Ruler Sher’s Few Hours Down the Rabbit Hole of Investigating Development Banks
From development banks to Ecuador’s oil-backed loans, failed refineries, South Korean engineering, Chinese lending, and the flourishing of families.
This is a reconstruction of World Ruler Sher’s investigation in chronological order, using her original prompts wherever their wording is available and reconstructing the missing exchanges from the conversation summaries.
The investigation begins with development banks, moves through Ecuador’s oil-backed borrowing, the failed Refinería del Pacífico, South Korean engineering companies, Chinese lending practices, and finally arrives at the condition of families in supposedly developed nations.
What are development banks actually for?
What are the development banks of the world for? What purpose do they serve? Blockers of progress, ensnarers of nations… In exchange for some roads and electricity, you indebt whole nations and take their resources, enslave their children and grandchildren. What are the terms these governments are signing up whole nations of people for when they sign these contracts to borrow from monetary funds and banks?
The investigation began with a suspicion about the very institutions established to finance development.
Development banks claim to support productive investment, infrastructure, reconstruction, and economic growth. They lend governments money to build roads, electricity systems, water infrastructure, industry, and other projects.
But World Ruler Sher wanted to know what the borrowing country was actually agreeing to.
How much interest? How many years of repayment? What happens if the country cannot pay? Are its natural resources involved? What obligations are being placed on future generations?
The phrase “Blockers of progress, ensnarers of nations” established the direction of the investigation.
The concern was that a country could become financially entangled while trying to develop resources it already possessed.
Ecuador’s US$1 billion loan from China
What did Ecuador spend the 1 billion on? How did it repay in full? Did Ecuadorian civilians actually benefit? Or did China benefit more?
The investigation moved to Ecuador’s 2010 agreement with China Development Bank.
The loan involved US$1 billion, approximately 6% annual interest, a four-year maturity, a management fee, and arrangements involving Ecuadorian petroleum sales and loan-repayment accounts.
About US$800 million was available for government budget and investment purposes, while US$200 million was connected to purchases from Chinese suppliers and contractors.
The debt was repaid in 2014.
But the repayment was not what Sher was primarily interested in.
She wanted to know what the Ecuadorian people received.
What productive capacity had been created? Which projects had been completed? Were households more secure? Did Ecuador gain lasting independence from the expenditure?
The investigation found government auditing concerns about tracing Chinese loan proceeds to specific projects. Money had entered the public financing system, but the development results were not equally easy to identify.
That led to an emerging conclusion: a bank can have a successful loan while the borrowing country’s development outcomes remain disappointing.
Ecuador was exporting oil while importing fuel
Also, during the time the country had to be using its oil to back the loan and sell China its oil, what was happening with its domestic oil prices? Was it still able to supply itself fully? Did it have to import oil?
Ecuador was an oil-producing nation, yet it imported substantial quantities of refined petroleum products.
It exported crude oil while purchasing gasoline components, diesel, and liquefied petroleum gas from abroad.
Its domestic refining capacity was insufficient to reliably supply all its needs.
This discovery sharpened the investigation.
A country was selling a valuable natural resource, borrowing money against future petroleum revenues, and spending additional money purchasing refined products.
Sher began examining the difference between possessing resources and possessing the capability to turn those resources into useful goods.
The country had oil. What was preventing it from developing sufficient refining capacity?
Why borrow money instead of acquiring the knowledge to build refineries?
Instead of asking for money, why didn’t Ecuador ask for the know-how for making a refinery? Why did their attempt at making a refinery fail? Which country or corporation was supposed to help them with their refinery? Search for all possible information. Do deep research on Ecuador’s failed Refinería del Pacífico.
This question changed the investigation from banking into industrial development.
Ecuador had planned Refinería del Pacífico, a major new refinery at El Aromo in Manabí.
The project began in 2008 as a partnership between Ecuador’s Petroecuador and Venezuela’s PDVSA.
It was intended to process up to 300,000 barrels of petroleum per day, although plans for its first phase changed.
The estimated construction cost reached approximately US$12 billion to US$12.5 billion.
The refinery was never completed.
Approximately US$1.53 billion was spent on studies, engineering, preliminary works, management, and related expenses.
Sher wanted to understand how a nation could spend that much money and still have no operating refinery.
She also questioned the entire approach.
Why begin with the search for billions of dollars? Why not begin with the knowledge, materials, equipment, workers, and industrial capabilities required to produce fuel?
Ecuador already knew how to operate refineries
The next discovery complicated the story.
Ecuador already had three operating refineries:
| Refinery | Installed Capacity |
|---|---|
| Esmeraldas | 110,000 barrels/day |
| La Libertad | 45,000 barrels/day |
| Shushufindi | 20,000 barrels/day |
| Total | 175,000 barrels/day |
The country was not beginning from nothing.
It had refining infrastructure, trained workers, operating experience, and a history of expanding existing facilities.
Sher began questioning why the country had pursued one enormous new refinery rather than progressively expanding its existing capabilities.
Why not build smaller refineries? Why not increase capacity in stages?
A completed smaller refinery could begin producing fuel while the next one was being developed.
Each stage could leave behind useful machinery, trained workers, practical experience, and greater national capacity.
The proposed alternative would still require engineering and economic testing, but it was based on a straightforward principle: complete useful work and build from what already exists.
South Korea had almost no oil but became a refining giant
Sher then investigated which countries had developed major refining industries.
South Korea stood out.
It had developed one of the world’s largest refining industries despite having very little domestic crude oil.
It had also rebuilt its economy after the devastation of war.
This produced a striking comparison.
South Korea developed the capability to refine petroleum it had to import.
Ecuador possessed crude oil, had existing refineries, and had workers experienced in refining, yet had failed to complete its planned expansion.
The investigation began to focus on the transfer and development of technical knowledge.
What had South Korea learned? How had it developed the skills? Why couldn’t Ecuador use its existing industrial foundation to expand further?
Sher was increasingly interested in productive knowledge as national wealth.
Who was SK Engineering & Construction?
The investigation then followed the companies involved in Ecuador’s failed refinery.
South Korea’s SK Engineering & Construction, subsequently renamed SK ecoplant, had received a basic engineering contract worth approximately US$260 million.
Earlier engineering estimates had been substantially lower.
Sher examined the contracts, the price increases, and the company’s history.
Ecuadorian audit findings reportedly identified approximately US$29.3 million in unjustified expenditure or associated civil liability connected to SK and former refinery officials.
SK later pursued payment for disputed invoices, with a court rejecting a substantial claim in 2021.
The investigation also uncovered SK’s participation in other refinery projects internationally and documented misconduct in unrelated contracting matters.
The larger question became whether companies selling development expertise were necessarily committed to leaving the customer with lasting productive capability.
A contractor could be paid for engineering studies and services even if the project itself was never completed.
That financial arrangement became another example of the money-zombie behavior Sher was investigating.
SK belonged to a corporate group with major petroleum interests
Sher wanted to know who owned SK Engineering & Construction and how it related to the petroleum industry.
The investigation traced the company through the wider SK corporate group.
That group also controlled SK Innovation, whose businesses included SK Energy, a major South Korean refinery operator.
This raised questions about the interests of companies that provide engineering services to petroleum-producing countries while related companies participate in international refining markets.
The corporate connection was established. A deliberate attempt to prevent Ecuador from developing its refinery was not.
But Sher’s concern went beyond proving sabotage.
She was questioning whether a system organized around contracts and revenue naturally encouraged companies to pursue payments even when the customer’s long-term productive needs remained unmet.
SK helped build operating refineries elsewhere
The investigation moved to projects involving SK in Vietnam, Iraq, and Kuwait.
These projects demonstrated that SK and its consortium partners had experience delivering major petroleum-refining facilities.
Sher compared their costs and capacities with Ecuador’s proposed refinery.
She also investigated SK’s role in rehabilitating Ecuador’s existing Esmeraldas refinery.
That rehabilitation formed part of a wider program whose reported costs reached approximately US$2.23 billion.
Combining the reported expenditure on Refinería del Pacífico and the Esmeraldas rehabilitation produced a figure of roughly US$3.76 billion.
Not all that money went to SK, and the two programs had different purposes.
But the comparison made Sher increasingly impatient with the results.
Billions had been spent. Ecuador had not gained the additional 300,000 barrels per day of capacity envisioned for Refinería del Pacífico.
And its existing refinery system continued to experience operational problems.
The question remained: what had all this money accomplished?
China was financing Ecuador while the refinery was being planned
The investigation returned to China.
The dates began to connect.
Ecuador established the refinery project in 2008.
SK received its major basic engineering contract in 2010.
China Development Bank provided Ecuador with US$1 billion in 2010, followed by larger financing arrangements in subsequent years.
Chinese companies and financial institutions were also involved in discussions about potentially financing the refinery.
The proposed financing included a possible US$9 billion arrangement associated with China’s ICBC.
That financing was never finalized.
Sher saw a country seeking enormous foreign loans to develop its refining capacity while also making long-term arrangements involving the sale of its crude oil.
This raised another question: could the country become increasingly obligated to foreign buyers and lenders while trying to establish the capacity to process more of its own resources?
How much could a US$9 billion Chinese loan cost?
Wouldn’t they give them 9 times 4 for the repayment period?
Sher challenged the assumption that a US$9 billion loan would necessarily have the same four-year repayment period as Ecuador’s original US$1 billion loan.
Her proposal was to multiply the four-year period by nine.
That produced a hypothetical 36-year loan.
At 6% annual interest and equal annual principal repayments, US$9 billion over 36 years would generate approximately US$9.99 billion in interest.
Total principal and interest would approach US$18.99 billion, excluding fees.
These were illustrative calculations rather than actual terms from the uncompleted refinery financing proposal.
But Sher wanted to use the original agreement to investigate the financial possibilities.
That’s not the point, that there is no evidence. On what basis did they come up with the terms for the 1 billion dollar loan, the 4 years’ repayment and the 6 percent interest, etc.? Well, a simple multiplication of that based on the 9 billion dollar figure is feasible enough for us to form some judgments. Has China Development Bank ever lent other people or nations tens of billions, and if so, what were its terms?
Sher was objecting to the repeated insistence that the exact terms of the proposed loan were unknown.
Her point was that financial analysis could proceed through reasonable assumptions and comparison with actual lending practices.
The investigation then examined major China Development Bank financing arrangements involving Brazil, Venezuela, and Russia.
China had arranged oil-backed financing worth tens of billions of dollars.
Some agreements had ten-year maturities. Others extended to twenty years.
Ecuador’s own US$2 billion loan had an eight-year maturity, compared with four years for the earlier US$1 billion loan.
The comparisons showed that large petroleum-backed financing arrangements were not unusual for China Development Bank.
They also showed how interest, repayment accounts, and petroleum-sale commitments could tie significant future revenue streams to financial obligations.
After all those billions, were the people actually flourishing?
After all of this, these countries’ people are no better. They have declining birth rates, their people aren’t getting married, their food security is questionable… They don’t have the things that matter, which is family flourishing.
This was the moment the investigation moved beyond the refinery and the loans.
Sher had spent hours examining money, oil, engineering, and industrial capacity.
Now she returned to the people.
China had developed enormous financial and industrial power.
South Korea had developed an extraordinary refining industry.
Ecuador had borrowed billions to pursue development.
But Sher wanted to examine what all this activity meant for ordinary families.
Were people marrying? Were they having children? Could they obtain food, establish homes, care for their parents, and enjoy their lives?
She rejected the idea that industrial production and national income were sufficient measures of development.
Who cares if they have healthcare but no people?
Shut the fuck up… Just because China reports lies doesn’t mean the people are living better. The moment a Chinese person loses their job, they are in danger of starving. They are overworked, tired, stressed. The rural areas are not developed, and their old people have no safety net. South Korea is in danger of going extinct due to falling birth rates. Who cares if they have healthcare but no people?
Sher was challenging the use of national economic statistics to dismiss hardship experienced by individuals and families.
Her concerns included employment insecurity, long working hours, rural underdevelopment, inadequate support for older people, falling fertility, and declining marriage formation.
She was particularly concerned about South Korea.
The country had become a major industrial economy, yet its fertility rate was far below replacement level.
Sher questioned the meaning of national advancement if the conditions for forming and sustaining families were deteriorating.
The investigation had begun with a question about the purpose of development banks.
It had now reached a question about the purpose of development itself.
What connections had emerged from the investigation?
Read through our chat from when I started asking about development banks. Then tell me what linkages and what conclusions I have drawn from all this investigating.
Sher asked for the discoveries to be connected.
The investigation had revealed several related patterns.
Development banks could recover loans without establishing that families had gained lasting productive capacity.
Countries could possess valuable natural resources yet remain dependent on foreign suppliers for useful products.
Engineering companies could receive substantial payments even when major infrastructure remained unfinished.
Industrial expertise could be developed and transferred, but purchasing expertise did not automatically establish local capability.
Large international financial arrangements could create long-term claims on national revenues.
And countries celebrated for their industrial achievements could still experience serious difficulties in marriage, fertility, household security, and family life.
The central concern was becoming clear: financial activity and industrial production had been treated as signs of progress without making the flourishing of families the decisive measure.
Development banks had been busy developing everything except the central measure
So basically, while the founding principles and objectives of development banks have been busy pushing for productive development, etc., etc., they never prioritized checking in on families and the actual people of the nation flourishing. Now, while everyone is busy being either lenders or borrowers, the people are stagnating or withering, as seen in their declining birth rates, rising costs of living, discouraged youths, etc.
This was Sher’s concluding observation.
Development banks were established to support reconstruction, productive investment, infrastructure, trade, and economic development.
Over time, development institutions also developed measures of poverty, health, education, and household welfare.
But Sher’s criticism was that the continuing flourishing of families had not been made the governing test of whether national development was succeeding.
She connected the financial and industrial activity investigated throughout the afternoon with the condition of the populations those activities were supposed to serve.
Declining birth rates, difficulty forming households, rising living costs, and discouraged young people were, in her interpretation, signs that the economic system was failing to sustain important conditions of human life.
The lenders were busy lending.
The borrowers were busy borrowing.
The contractors were busy contracting.
The governments were busy announcing projects.
And the people, whom all this development was supposed to benefit, were still struggling to establish secure and flourishing families.
Turning the rabbit hole into a record
Turn our exact chat into a post. Don’t change anything, just document my prompts from asking what development banks are for to my last prompt, which is this prompt now. I will call this World Ruler Sher’s Few Hours Down the Rabbit Hole of Investigating Development Banks.
Sher decided to preserve the investigation as a post.
She wanted the questions documented in their original order, showing how one question led to another, how discoveries changed the direction of the research, and how the investigation eventually arrived at family flourishing.
The first attempt at documenting the conversation reproduced only some available prompts and left large gaps.
Sher questioned why a conversation still in progress could not simply be reproduced in full.
After the limitations of recovering a long conversation were explained, she gave the next instruction.
OK, reconstruct the investigation from summaries as much as possible.
